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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I examine Liam Shields’ principle of sufficient autonomy. 
This principle is in many ways interesting and plausible, but it is also in 
some important respects inadequately specified. In particular, I argue that 
a) the role of satiable reasons should be clarified, b) the relation to the 
conditions of freedom should be made more explicit, and c) the threshold 
for sufficient autonomy should be specified.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In his recent book Just Enough, Liam Shields presents a novel form 
of sufficientarianism, which he calls shift-sufficientarianism. Most 
sufficientarian theories accept what Paula Casal (2007: 317) has termed the 
positive and the negative theses.2 According to the positive thesis, there is 
a level of benefits such that it is especially important, from the point of 
view of distributive justice, that people reach it. According to the negative 
thesis, further questions of distributive justice do not arise above this level. 
The negative thesis is controversial,3 and Shields sides with critics who 
hold that it is implausible (Arneson 2005; Casal 2007; Shields 2016). He 
therefore discards the negative thesis and claims that sufficientarians can 
make do with a combination of the positive thesis and the shift thesis: 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Nordic Network in Political 
Theory in Stockholm in 2017. I am grateful to the participants at that event, as well as to the 
guest editors, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal, for many helpful comments 
and suggestions.
2 See for instance Axelsen and Nielsen (2015), Benbaji (2005, 2006), Crisp (2003), 
Frankfurt (1987), Huseby (2010, 2012), Nielsen (2016).
3 The extent to which it is controversial depends on where the threshold is set. The 
lower the threshold, the more controversial the thesis.
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“Once people have secured enough, there is a discontinuity in the rate of 
change of the marginal weight of our reasons to benefit them further” 
(2016: 30).4 
The main advantage of this proposal is that it saves sufficientarians 
from having to claim that benefits and distribution above the threshold 
are completely irrelevant. Rather, benefits to the sufficiently well off 
matter somewhat, but benefits to those below the threshold matter 
disproportionately more. This view is in some respects similar to 
prioritarianism. However, it differs from prioritarianism in that the moral 
value of benefits does not decrease continuously the better off the recipient 
is.5 Rather, there is a break, or a shift, at the sufficiency threshold.6
From the formulation of the shift thesis (2016: 30), one gets the impression 
that when distributing some good G it is especially important that people 
get a sufficient amount of G and that, beyond this, it might still be valuable, 
though less so, to provide people with further G. On this understanding, 
the reasons we have for supplying G do not change, but the weight of these 
reasons diminishes. However, it appears that Shields also thinks that the 
reasons can change altogether at the threshold (2016: 30). On this 
understanding, it is still important that people receive sufficient G, but 
after that, further provisions of G, if valuable, are valuable in light of some 
reason other than the value of G. For instance, G, above the threshold, 
might lead to the realization of some other good, W. I assume, however, 
that there will still be a discontinuity in the rate of change of the marginal 
weight in the cases where the reasons as such change. Otherwise, the shift 
thesis would not apply to this latter version.7
My aim in this paper is to examine the most specific proposal for a shift 
sufficientarian principle made by Shields, namely the principle of sufficient 
autonomy. In my view, this principle is in important respects not sufficiently 
specified. However, since I am in general sympathetic to the suggestion of 
a principle of sufficient autonomy, my criticisms are largely calls for 
clarification and further development of the view.
4 The shift thesis was first presented in Shields (2012: 108).
5 See for instance Holtug (2010: 133).
6 Gustaf Arrhenius has suggested that prioritarianism really is characterized by 
many small shifts, and that Shields’ theory, with only one shift, is a minimal form of 
prioritarianism. This seems plausible to me, but I will nevertheless treat it as a version of 
sufficientarianism here.
7 Shields also holds that the shift could come about as a result of conflict between 
reasons (2016: 39). I leave this alternative aside here
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2. SATIABILITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT 
AUTONOMY
Shields cashes out the shift in terms of satiable reasons, based on Raz’ 
concept of satiable principles. 
“Satiable principles are marked by one feature: the demands the 
principles impose can be perfectly met. When they are completely met 
then whatever may happen and whatever might have happened the 
principles cannot be, nor could they have been, satisfied to a higher 
degree” (Raz 1986: 235f, cited in Shields 2016: 36).
Shields further writes:
“Our reasons to benefit people change when they are no longer deficient 
in the relevant respect. There may be strong claims for benefits beyond 
the application of that reason, we need not be upper limit sufficientarians, 
but such claims must be made using a different profile of reasons. This 
alters our all things considered reasons to benefit people further” (2016: 37).
Shields oscillates, as noted, between suggesting that (only) the weight 
of the reasons change, and that the reasons themselves (also) change. 
Nonetheless, in the elaboration of the principle of sufficient autonomy, 
Shields for the most part writes as if the reasons change altogether. 
According to this principle, “…we have weighty, non-instrumental, 
non-egalitarian reasons to secure sufficient autonomy to secure the 
social conditions of freedom” (2016: 53).8 Even though satiability is not 
incorporated explicitly into this formulation, it is clear that the principle 
is intended to be satiable (see 2016: 45, 50, 57).
3. IS THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT AUTONOMY 
SATIABLE? 
Despite Shields’ intentions, it is unclear whether the principle of 
sufficient autonomy really is satiable. Note that there are two ways of 
understanding satiability in this context. First, we could think of satiability 
as applied directly to autonomy (or to whatever value a principle is intended 
to promote). On this view, autonomy is a satiable concept if one can be fully 
autonomous. This understanding is indicated by Shields when he writes 
that “[o]ur reasons to benefit people change when they are no longer 
deficient in the relevant respect (2016: 37; see also 2012: 118)”. He further 
illustrates sufficiency with reference to “enough sleep”, and “enough 
8 I return to the social conditions of freedom below
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petrol” (2106: 29), and satiability with reference to “enough money for a 
bus ticket” (2016: 36). These examples suggest that satiability refers to the 
value that we should have a sufficient amount of.  
Alternatively, satiability might refer to the principle of sufficiency itself 
(2016: 64). Sufficiency is straightforwardly a satiable principle, since 
enough is enough. Utilitarianism is not satiable, because there can always 
be more utility. On this view, sufficient autonomy does not (necessarily) 
demand full autonomy, but autonomy to some degree that is deemed 
sufficient for some other reason. Since it is not perfectly clear to me which 
of these views Shields holds, I will discuss both. I discuss the former in this 
section, and the latter (more indirectly) in the two subsequent sections. 
According to Shields, “[a]utonomy is the ideal of living one’s life in 
accordance with one’s own authentic judgments” (2016: 47). Autonomy, 
moreover, is characterized both by the absence of external pressure or 
constraints, such as threats, coercion or brainwashing, as well as the 
presence of options and powers of deliberation. Both aspects are needed 
for people to be autonomous (2016: 47f). However, Shields also writes: 
“To flesh this out we can say that sufficient autonomy has three 
conditions. One has secured sufficient autonomy when (1) one is well-
informed, (2) one can give reasons for one’s views, and (3) one has a 
disposition to exchange reasons and participate in a public deliberative 
process with others” (2016: 53). 
I focus nevertheless on freedom from coercion, options, and deliberative 
powers in the following, as these seem more central to the concept of 
autonomy. After all, one can meet the three fleshed-out conditions above 
without having any options, and without being free from external 
constraints. I take it, moreover, that being well-informed, and having the 
ability to give reasons for one’s views can plausibly be subsumed under 
deliberative powers.
Consider now the different aspects of autonomy in terms of (the first 
understanding of) satiability. The first, freedom from coercion, does 
admittedly seem satiable. One can presumably be perfectly free from 
external pressures and constraints. The second aspect is less clearly 
satiable. One can always have more options to choose from and one can 
always gain better powers of deliberation. Thus, there is a sense in which 
one can never be fully autonomous, and one’s claim for autonomy cannot 
be perfectly sated.
An obvious rejoinder is that there will still be some level at which even 
more (trivial) options, and even more finely developed powers of 
deliberation, makes no difference for any practical purposes. Perhaps one 
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already has all the options one could possibly want, and perhaps one is 
able to rank all these options (and their combinations) perfectly on an 
ordinal scale. Adding options one does not want, or gaining the ability to 
rank the options and their combinations cardinally, makes no difference, 
let us assume, to how one leads one’s life. In such cases, I agree that 
autonomy is sated, for practical purposes. 
However, if autonomy is satiable, even if only in this practical sense, 
another question arises. Now it is not clear that further increasing autonomy 
above the sufficiency level will contribute to people’s welfare, or anything 
else for that matter. If satiable in this way, satiability occurs at such a high 
level that there does not seem to be any further reason, egalitarian or 
otherwise, to provide people with even more autonomy. The principle of 
sufficient autonomy now looks like an upper limit sufficiency principle 
that conforms to the negative thesis.
One could imagine, though, that a person who is, for practical purposes, 
perfectly autonomous, can still benefit from more of the stuff that 
constitutes autonomy, for reasons not to do with autonomy. For instance, a 
person might get a thrill from gaining access to even more trivial options, 
even though none of these additional options will be chosen. Or, the person 
might enjoy even better deliberative powers, for the feeling of being super-
clever.9 However, if so, I am inclined to think that what is provided is not 
more autonomy as such, but more options or more deliberative powers. To 
illustrate, suppose you are perfectly nourished. There are, for all practical 
purposes, no way for you to be even more nourished. Suppose however, 
that more vitamin D (unrealistically) might provide you with a nice tan. If 
so, providing you with more vitamin D, does not in that case provide you 
with more nourishment, it gives you more vitamin D (and a tan). It seems 
then, that if the principle of sufficient autonomy is satiable (with respect to 
autonomy), it is likely to be so at such a high level that it is hard to detect a 
relevant shift. 
Consider now the alternative understanding of satiability. Perhaps 
there is a level of autonomy that is sufficient, regardless of whether or not it 
is equivalent to full or perfect autonomy. The reasons for promoting 
someone’s autonomy, then, are sated when they reach this level. This might 
be perfectly reasonable, but the level would have to be specified. As will 
become clear below, it is hard to find such a specification in Shields’ 
treatment of sufficient autonomy. Let me note, at any rate, that the first 
kind of satiability has an obvious advantage: It is very useful for defining a 
threshold. Sufficientarianism is sometimes criticized for the alleged 
9 I am grateful to David Axelsen for raising this point.
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arbitrariness of the threshold(s). The first notion of satiability might help 
meet this objection.
4. THE SOCIAL CONDIITONS OF FREEDOM
As noted, Shields ties the ideal of autonomy to the social conditions for 
freedom in society. However, the link between these two concepts is not 
entirely clear:
“The principle of sufficient autonomy, supported by the sufficientarian 
reason we have to live under the social conditions of freedom, can be 
stated thus: we have weighty, non-instrumental, non-egalitarian 
reasons to secure sufficient autonomy to secure the social conditions of 
freedom. The conditions of freedom are those conditions under which 
one’s beliefs and actions can be considered freely taken” (2016: 54).
The last sentence of the quote indicates that the social conditions of 
freedom are those conditions under which autonomy is possible (or likely, 
or certain). Both the conditions of freedom and the principle of autonomy, 
moreover, appear to be sufficientarian concepts, but the former supports 
the latter. Shields suggests, moreover, that the social conditions for freedom 
ought to be such that they are sufficient, as opposed to merely necessary, 
for the development of sufficient autonomy (see also 2016: 45, 48, 53, 54).
However, the first sentence seems to indicate the opposite; that 
autonomy is a condition for the social conditions of freedom. It could be 
the case that autonomy and the social conditions of freedom are 
interdependent in a way that vindicates both views. However, it seems to 
me more plausible to say that autonomy presupposes certain societal 
conditions for its realization, than to say that the social conditions for 
freedom presupposes autonomy for its realization. Shields points to a 
proper education, an ethos marked by toleration, and reliable information 
as parts of the conditions of freedom (2016: 53). These factors are more 
plausibly seen as conditions for the development of autonomy, than the 
other way around.
However, even if we accept this, there is a further option. There are 
formulations that suggest that autonomy is itself (the whole or a part of) the 
social conditions of freedom: “…I set out and provide an initial defence of 
the account of autonomy that constitutes the conditions of freedom” (2016: 
46). Further: “One reason for promoting individual autonomy is our interest 
in the conditions of freedom. It is a weighty, non-egalitarian reason that is 
satiable with respect to autonomy, at least” (2016: 57). The last quote gives 
the impression that autonomy is one (satiable) part of what constitutes the 
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conditions of freedom (see also 2016: 57, 58, 60)
I confess to being unable to determine whether the social conditions of 
freedom are to be understood as those conditions that are (necessary and) 
sufficient for the realization of sufficient autonomy, or whether sufficient 
autonomy constitutes (or is a condition for) the social conditions for 
freedom. However, the question is important for how we interpret the 
principle of sufficient autonomy as a satiable sufficientarian principle.
The reason is that if autonomy is a part of what constitutes the conditions 
of freedom (or if it is a condition of freedom in itself), then it could be the 
case that autonomy can be sated with respect to the conditions of freedom. 
Sufficient autonomy just is autonomy sufficient for the realization of 
(sufficient) conditions of freedom. However, in my view, this interpretation 
squares badly with Shields’ presentation of the principle, according to 
which there are supposed to be weighty, non-instrumental, satiable 
reasons to provide peoples with sufficient autonomy (2016: 45). There 
might be ways to interpret autonomy as non-instrumentally valuable even 
if it is a constitutive part of the conditions of freedom. But this is not stated 
explicitly, and would require further elaboration and specification.
5. THE SUFFICIENY THRESHOLD
In this section, I consider the way Shields specifies the threshold for 
sufficient autonomy (regardless of how satiability is understood, and on 
the assumption that the threshold is not determined in light of the demands 
of the conditions of freedom). Note first that there are several formulations 
concerning this threshold in the book, and that not all of them point in the 
same direction. However, what is perfectly clear is that Shields assumes 
that there is a level at which we can say that a person has sufficient 
autonomy, and that there might, because of the shift that occurs at this 
level, be further reasons to promote the autonomy of those who already 
have sufficient autonomy (2016: 54).
Shields offers an example of the importance of sufficient autonomy 
with reference to the information needed to assess the risks associated 
with buying a house.
“If we do not know the risk, but we know how to find out about it, we 
might think that we choose freely … If we are well informed enough to 
become well informed about the other relevant decisions we make, 
then our reasons to become more and more well informed thereafter 
may be very different” (2106: 53).
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The latter part of the quote, obviously, indicates a shift. However, it is 
not clear how this works. Suppose I face a risk. I do not know the risk 
exactly, but I do know how to calculate it (or as Shields suggests, I have the 
contact details of a surveyor that can help me assess the risk). In this 
situation, I am not as autonomous as I can be. But I am free to become as 
autonomous as I can be (with regards to this particular decision). It is up to 
me whether to pick up the phone or start punching numbers into the 
calculator. Something similar can be said about the “well-informed 
enough to become well-informed” part of the quote. 
The shift, on the view suggested here, is located at the level at which we 
are sufficiently autonomous to choose to become fully autonomous. This 
might be plausible, but it seems that this amounts to a view of sufficiency 
that is, in a relevant sense, an upper limit view, of the sort Shields aims to 
avoid. One might say, of course, in line with the shift thesis, that the reasons 
to promote a person’s autonomy above the level at which it is up to the 
person herself to become fully autonomous, change. But more likely, they 
disappear. For all practical purposes, one is fully autonomous when one 
has direct access to becoming fully autonomous. It makes no sense to 
benefit a person, in terms of autonomy, because she has not decided to 
punch the numbers, place the call, or perhaps consult the relevant 
literature. There is no longer a recognizable distributive issue to be 
addressed.
Another view is suggested by the following: “Only once an agent is 
autonomous can we fully respect his or her answer to the question ‘Do you 
want to enhance your autonomy?’ We owe them autonomy sufficient for 
making these kinds of choices freely as part of justice” (2016: 56). While it 
is certainly true that people should be (at least) sufficiently autonomous to 
know whether they want to become more autonomous, it is unlikely that 
people are sufficiently autonomous from the point of view of justice, at this 
exact level. The reason is that this level might be quite low, at least along 
some relevant dimensions. For instance, people who are severely oppressed, 
and have very few options, may well be more than sufficiently autonomous 
for us to respect their wish to become more autonomous. The alternative is 
clearly disrespectful. Notice that the level of autonomy that Shields points 
to here might (or might not) mark a relevant shift, but not a shift that 
signifies sufficient autonomy.10
Further, Shields claims that 
“Sufficient autonomy is the level of deliberative competence that 
enables us to have assurance from an external point of view that we 
10 For a similar suggestion, though in more convoluted terms, see Shields (2016: 57).
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choose for ourselves. This kind of autonomy requires us to be capable 
of deliberating with others about the reasons that support our 
conception of the good. We may have weighty reasons to secure more 
autonomy…” (2016: 64).
The first part of the quote points to one intuitively important and 
plausible aspect of autonomy, namely self-rule. However, it is unclear what 
level exactly it refers to. What does it take to be sure that a person chooses 
for herself? And what aspects of autonomy is it that can be further promoted, 
but for different reasons? It is unclear what level of freedom from constraints 
and access to options, for instance, are also required, since these aspects 
are not mentioned. The notion of choosing for oneself, then, does not point 
to a clearly discernible level of sufficient autonomy.
In other passages, Shields suggests that ambition, and our conceptions 
of the good may influence the level of autonomy that we want, but that the 
level of sufficient autonomy is independent of such ambitions and 
conceptions (2016: 65). A similar view is suggested in the case of Agnes and 
Bernadette (see 2016: 70f). Bernadette supposedly has sufficient autonomy, 
because the reasons we might have to promote her autonomy further are 
instrumental with regards her welfare, and not non-instrumental with 
regards to her autonomy. On Shields’ description, she has “many options”, 
the “ability to make medium- and long-term plans, can usually spot 
contradictions in her own judgments and can remedy them”, “makes 
reasoned assessments of various ways of life, and is not being denied 
information about the costs and benefits of her choices” (2016: 70). 
This arguably offers some substance, but it is still not clear enough. I 
will not detail all the ways in which these different elements are less than 
perfectly specific. However, I think it is worth pointing out that the 
subsequent claim that our reasons to boost Bernadette’s autonomy further 
is dependent on whether or not it can contribute to her well-being, suggests 
a fairly high level of autonomy (2016: 71). The reason is that the level at 
which more autonomy does not have non-instrumental value sufficient for 
speaking in favor of further promotion by itself, appears to be high. It 
would be good, of course, to know how high. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The principle of sufficient autonomy might turn out to be a valuable and 
plausible principle. However, at present, I think that the principle needs 
further specification when it comes to the understanding of satiability, the 
relation to the conditions of freedom, and the location of the threshold. In 
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closing, I would like to add a fourth call for clarification: the principle of 
sufficient autonomy is clearly only one among several principles of justice. 
Shields suggests that there might be many others, and that not all of them 
need to be sufficientarian. However, in the book, it is hard to get a clear 
view of the larger picture. It would be interesting to learn more about how 
these different principles relate to each other and form a coherent general 
theory of distributive justice.
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